We study a standard model of exchange economies with individual endowments. It is well known that no rule is individually rational, ecient, and strategyproof. In order to quantify the extent of this impossibility, we parametrize axioms on allocation rules. Given an axiom A, a parametrization of A is a continuum of axioms {δ-A} δ∈ [0, 1] such that (i) δ-A is equivalent to A only if δ = 1; (ii) δ-A is vacuous only if δ = 0; and (iii) for each pair δ, δ ∈ [0, 1] with δ < δ , δ -A implies δ-A. Thus, as δ decreases from 1 to 0, δ-A weakens monotonically, eventually to a vacuous requirement. We consider two parametrizations {δ-eciency} δ∈[0,1] and {δ-strategy-proofness} δ∈ [0, 1] , and investigate their compatibility with individual rationality for the class of two-agent economies dened on a domain containing linear preference relations. We show that (i) for each δ ∈ (0, 1], no rule is individually rational, δ-ecient, and strategy-proof ; and (ii) for each δ ∈ (0, 1], no rule is individually rational, ecient, and δ-strategy-proof. These results strengthen existing impossibility theorems in two directions that have not been explored so far.
Introduction
We study standard exchange economies with individual endowments. There is a set of perfectly divisible commodities. Each agent has a preference relation dened over nonnegative amounts of those commodities. He also owns some amounts of the commodities, which we call an (individual) endowment. An economy is a prole of preference relations and endowments, and an allocation for the economy is a prole of (consumption) bundles whose sum is equal to the sum of the endowments. An (allocation) rule assigns to each economy an allocation for it.
Our objective is to search for rules satisfying some desirable properties, or axioms, and the following three axioms have long dominated the literature on this quest: (i) individual rationality, the requirement that for each economy, a rule assign to each agent a bundle that he nds at least as desirable as his endowment; (ii) eciency, the requirement that for each economy, a rule select an allocation such that no other allocation Pareto dominates it; and (iii) strategy-proofness, the requirement that a rule select allocations in such a way that no agent ever benets from lying about his preference relation.
The three requirements, however, are incompatible. Hurwicz (1972) shows that for the class of two-agent and two-commodity economies, no rule meets all of them.
1 Subsequent studies strengthen this theorem mainly in two directions.
2 The rst strengthening involves establishing similar results on smaller preference domains. Hurwicz (1972) works with classical preference relations (i.e., those that are continuous, monotone, and strictly convex). As it turns out, this is quite a rich domain, and one can derive his impossibility theorem with a much smaller subset of preference relations. Parallel results are available on the domain of linear preference relations (Schummer, 1997 ) and the domain of CES preference relations (Ju, 2003) .
The second way of strengthening is to show that each ecient and strategy-proof rule violates some fairness axiom, and then obtain Hurwicz's (1972) theorem as a corollary. A number of papers consider the following as fairness criteria: (i) non-dictatorship, 1 Hurwicz's (1972) theorem covers only two-agent and two-commodity economies, and Serizawa 2 Most papers cited here pursue the two directions simultaneously. 1 the requirement that there be no agent who receives everything for each economy (Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin, 1979; Ju, 2003; and Schummer, 1997) ; (ii) noninversedictatorship, the requirement that there be no agent who receives nothing for each economy (Zhou, 1991) ; and (iii) minimum consumption guarantee, the requirement that each agent receive a bundle bounded away from the origin (Serizawa and Weymark, 2003) .
Among this range of stronger impossibility results, absent is a theorem that weakens eciency or strategy-proofness while maintaining individual rationality. 3 We attribute the absence to two sources. The rst relates to the indisputable normative appeal of eciency and strategy-proofness. Viewed separately, eciency is so mild a requirement that weakening it appears hardly necessary (no economist would object to making one agent better o without hurting any other agent). On the other hand, strategyproofness, though demanding, is an axiom that we cannot dispense with in the context where agents' private information, e.g., preference relations, should be elicited. On these grounds, the two axioms are widely accepted, to the extent that most axiomatic analyses take them as basic requirements and study the consequences of imposing some other axioms additionally.
The inherent diculty in weakening eciency or strategy-proofness has also played an important role. When a rule violates eciency, it is not trivial to quantify the extent of that violation. On the other hand, if a rule is not strategy-proof, it is often subjected to the following test: in how many economies can an agent protably misreport his private information? 4 While this is one way of quantifying the degree of manipulability, it does not measure how much an agent can gain with strategic behavior.
Our motivation to weaken eciency and strategy-proofness goes beyond theoretical interest and is based on the following scenario we model. A group of agents, each with an endowment, gather to nd an allocation that is benecial to all. The endowments are privately owned, and we operationalize this notion of private ownership by giving each agent the right to consume his endowment if he so desires. Then as the agents negotiate on who gets what, their endowments serve as a critical benchmark: whenever the collective decision assigns an agent a bundle less desirable than his endowment, he can simply walk out. In situations like this, individual rationality is an axiom that should be met at all costs, and Hurwicz (1972) suggests that we cannot have both eciency and strategy-proofness. Then how much of eciency should we sacrice to have an individually rational and strategy-proof rule? Or how much of strategy-proofness should we abandon to have an individually rational and ecient rule? These are the questions we address.
The contribution of this paper consists in (i) providing weakenings of eciency and strategy-proofnessin fact, parametrizations thereof; and (ii) showing that when combined with individual rationality, either of the two axioms forces a rule to satisfy only the vacuous version of the remaining axiom. Before introducing our parametrizations, let us rst explain an underlying principle. Let A be an axiom. Let [0, 1] be the parameter space and δ the parameter. A parametrization of A is a continuum of axioms {δ-A} δ∈[0,1] such that (i) δ-A is equivalent to A only if δ = 1; (ii) δ-A is vacuous only if δ = 0; and (iii) for each pair δ, δ ∈ [0, 1] with δ < δ , δ -A implies δ-A. In short, decreasing δ from 1 to 0 weakens A monotonically, eventually to a vacuous requirement.
Our parametrizations of eciency and strategy-proofness are in line with this spirit, and in order to weaken the axioms monotonically, we use the Hausdor distance in the Euclidean space.
More specically, the parametrization of eciency is obtained by the following procedure. Given an economy, normalize to one the Hausdor distance (induced by the standard Euclidean distance) between the set of ecient allocations and the set of feasible allocations.
5 For each δ ∈ [0, 1], an allocation is δ-ecient if the normalized distance between the allocation and the set of ecient allocations is 1 − δ. As δ decreases from 1 to 0, the set of δ-ecient allocations expands monotonically, eventually coinciding with the set of feasible allocations. A rule is δ-ecient if for each economy, it selects a δ-ecient allocation.
Next, to illustrate the parametrization of strategy-proofness, let δ ∈ [0, 1]. Fix an economy and an agent. Normalize to one the Hausdor distance between (i) the 5 Our denition of feasibility requires that the sum of bundles equals the sum of endowments. Since we work with strictly monotone preference relations, the latter denition allows us to ignore those uninteresting allocations that waste some of endowments.
3 set of feasible bundles; and (ii) the intersection of the set of feasible bundles and the lower contour set of his true preference relation at the bundle he receives by telling the truth. Then δ-strategy-proofness requires that each bundle he can obtain with misrepresentation lie within the normalized distance 1 − δ of set (ii). As δ decreases from 1 to 0, the set of bundles that the agent can receive by lying expands monotonically, and when δ = 0, δ-strategy-proofness places no restriction.
Our parametrizations enable us to measure the degree of incompatibility of individual rationality, eciency, and strategy-proofness. In light of Hurwicz's (1972) theorem, one may expect that for δ ∈ [0, 1) suciently close to 1, (i) no rule is individual rational, δ-ecient, and strategy-proof ; and (ii) no rule is individual rational, ecient, and δ-strategy-proof. But what we show is much stronger than these conjectures. We establish that for the class of two-agent economies dened on a domain containing linear preference relations, for each δ ∈ (0, 1], statements (i) and (ii) above are true (Theorems 1 and 2, respectively). The remaining case of δ = 0 is an exception. For (i), the no-trade rule, namely the rule that for each economy, selects the endowment prole as an allocation, satises the three axioms; and for (ii), any rule that for each economy, selects an individually rational and ecient allocation, satises the three axioms.
One may criticize our parametrizations, saying that the expansion process used to dene δ-eciency and δ-strategy-proofness have little welfare content in it. For instance, there is an economy with, say, a 0.3-ecient allocation that Pareto dominates a 0.6-ecient allocation; and an agent may benet more greatly by manipulating a 0.3-strategy-proof rule than by manipulating a 0.6-strategy-proof rule. Such criticism would be warranted if we compared the 0.3-ecient and 0.6-ecient allocations and announced, say, that the latter is more desirable than the former; or if we argued that the 0.6-strategy-proof rule is less vulnerable to strategic misrepresentation than the 0.3-strategy-proof rule is. But we make no comparison of this kind, nor is it our focus.
Rather, our focus is on weakening eciency and strategy-proofness to the extent that each of them reduces to a near-vacuous requirement, and showing that even in such extreme case, they remain incompatible with other axioms.
Further, as δ approaches zero, the Euclidean distance plays an increasingly minor role in our parametrizations. Since preference relations are continuous, for δ ∈ (0, 1] 4 suciently close to zero, almost all feasible allocations, and hence almost all proles of feasible welfare levels, are considered δ-ecient; similarly, δ-strategy-proofness allows an agent to attain almost all feasible bundles, and hence almost all feasible welfare levels, by manipulating a rule. These observations suggest that the Euclidean distance is not the main driving factor in our impossibility results. Motivated by the latter intuition, we check whether our results are robust to changes in the distance notion in the Euclidean space or the parametrization method.
Concerning the issue of using dierent distance notions, Theorem 1 remains true even if an arbitrary distance is used to dene δ-eciency; and Theorem 2 holds as long as a distance satisfying a mild requirement is used to dene δ-strategy-proofness.
Similarly, the two theorems continue to hold if we adopt dierent parametrization methods. We provide conditions that reasonable parametrizations of eciency and strategy-proofness should satisfy, and then show that similar results follow under those conditions (Theorems 3 and 4).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We set up the model in Section 2 and introduce axioms on rules in Section 3. Our impossibility results are in Section 4, and we check their robustness in Section 5.
The Model
Let N ≡ {1, · · · , n} be the set of agents and M ≡ {1, · · · , m} the set of commodities.
For each i ∈ N , agent i has (i) a continuous, strictly monotone, 6 and convex preference
Denote by P i and I i the strict preference and indierence relations, respectively, associated with R i .
Let R be a domain of admissible preference relations on R M + . Let R ≡ (R i ) i∈N be the preference prole and ω ≡ (ω i ) i∈N the endowment prole.
We are primarily concerned with linear preference relations, i.e., those that can be represented by linear functions. Let R lin be the domain of linear preference relations.
For each R 0 ∈ R lin , all relevant information about R 0 is captured by a vector r 0 ∈ 6 A preference relation R i is strictly monotone if for each pair x i , y i ∈ R M + such that for each ∈ M , x i ≥ y i , with at least one strict inequality, x i P i y i . 
Note that we require equality in the denition of feasibility. To explain why we use this formulation, consider a prole of bundles whose sum is less than the sum of endowments. Since we work with strictly monotone preference relations, we can always make the agents better o by distributing the remaining amount. Consequently, as agents negotiate on allocation of the endowments, the proposed prole of bundles is not renegotiation-proof. In this regard, such proles of bundles are not appealing, and our formulation of feasibility allows us to ignore them from the outset (for consequences of this formulation, see Footnote 10).
Finally, we use the following notation. For each R 0 ∈ R and each 
Axioms on Allocation Rules
In this section, we introduce axioms on rules. Our rst axiom places a lower bound on agents' welfare. Given an economy, each agent is equipped with an endowment.
Interpreting this as his private ownership, we are interested in allocations that respect it.
Therefore, in order for an allocation to be desirable, it should assign each agent a bundle that he nds at least as preferable as his endowment. Formally, for each (R, ω) ∈ E(R)
and each x ∈ Z(ω), x is individually rational for
Let IR(R, ω) be the set of all individually rational allocations for (R, ω). The following axiom requires that for each economy, a rule select an individually rational allocation.
Individual Rationality: For each (R, ω) ∈ E(R), ϕ(R, ω) is individually rational for (R, ω).
To introduce our next axiom, we rst dene the notion of Pareto dominance. Let
be the set of all ecient allocations for (R, ω). The following axiom requires that for each economy, a rule select an ecient allocation. 
. As δ ∈ (0, 1) becomes smaller, E δ (R, ω) expands monotonically while maintaining a similar shape, and when δ = 0, it coincides with the set of feasible allocations.
In short, decreasing δ from 1 to 0 weakens A monotonically, eventually to a vacuous requirement.
To parametrize eciency, note that the axiom requires a rule to select from the set of ecient allocations. In other words, the Euclidean distance between the chosen allocation and the set of ecient allocations is zero. If a rule is not ecient, then the latter distance is positive, the maximum of which is the Hausdor distance between the set of feasible allocations and the set of ecient allocations. Thus, one way of weakening eciency is to allow a rule to choose an allocation that lies within a certain distance from the set of ecient allocations, relative to the maximum distance (as long as the maximum distance is positive).
9 Let E δ (R, ω) be the set of all δ-ecient allocations for (R, ω). As δ decreases from 1 to 0, the set of δ-ecient allocations expands monotonically, and when δ = 0, it covers the set of feasible allocations.
10 The following axiom requires that for each economy, a rule select a δ-ecient allocation.
δ-Eciency:
(1, 0) and ω 2 = (0, 1). Let R ∈ R N lin be as specied in Figure 1 . We use the Edgeworth
. In order to obtain E 0.7 (R, ω), for each x ∈ E(R, ω), take a closed ball of radius 0.3d (ω, E(R, ω)) centered at x, and then take the union of all those balls.
monotonically while maintaining a similar shape. When δ = 0, E δ (R, ω) = Z(ω) and δ-eciency has no bite.
Our last axiom pertains to the strategic behavior of agents. In many applications, agents' preference relations are private information and agents are not constrained to tell the truth. In fact, an agent may nd it protable to misrepresent his preference relation and manipulate the rule in his favor. Thus, we require that a rule be immune to such misrepresentation. Whatever the announcement of other agents are, no agent ever benets from lying about his preference relation.
Strategy-proofness: For each (R, ω) ∈ E(R), each i ∈ N , and each R i ∈ R,
9 If ||ω|| is small, even a slight expansion of the set of ecient allocations may contain the set of feasible allocations. Therefore, we use the distance d (Z(ω), E(R, ω)) as a normalizing factor so that δ-eciency properly factors in the size of an economy under consideration.
10 Our denition of feasibility requires that the sum of bundles equal the sum of endowments. Therefore, if δ = 0, E δ (R, ω) coincides with the set of allocations that satisfy this condition, but it still excludes those that do not fully allocate the endowments among the agents. We believe that the latter allocations do not deserve much attention since we work with strictly monotone preference relations.
Figure 2: Illustration of δ-strategy-proofness (Example 2). Let M = {1, 2} and (R, ω) ∈ E(R). Let i ∈ N , and suppose that R i and ϕ i (R, ω) are as specied in the g-
. By contrast, 0.7-strategy-proofness only requires that
. Similarly, 0.3-strategy-proofness requires that
, then δ-strategy-proofness allows agent i to obtain any feasible bundle with misrepresentation.
Note incidentally that our notion of misrepresentation is restricted to that of preference relations, excluding endowments. We can also imagine a situation where each agent's endowment is private information and a rule takes as an input whatever the agents submit as their endowments. This provides agents with an additional incentive to lie, where the lie can take various forms (e.g., withhold or destroy part of one's endowment; and borrow some amount of the commodities from the outside world and add it to one's endowment). The following papers examine the implications of endowment manipulation: Aumann and Peleg (1974), Hurwicz (1972 Hurwicz ( , 1978 , Postlewaite (1979) , and Thomson (2008) Now we parametrize strategy-proofness much the same way we parametrized eciency. Let 
As δ decreases from 1 to 0, δ-strategy-proofness expands the set of bundles that an agent can attain with misrepresentation. When δ = 0, the latter set is the same as the set of feasible bundles and δ-strategy-proofness has no bite.
Example 2. Illustration of δ-strategy-proofness. Let M = {1, 2} and (R, ω) ∈ E(R).
Let i ∈ N , and suppose that R i and ϕ i (R, ω) are as specied in Figure 2 . Strategyproofness requires that for each 
decreases, the set of bundles that agent i can achieve expands monotonically, eventually containing all feasible bundles when δ = 0.
Impossibility Results
It is well known that no rule is individually rational, ecient, and strategy-proof. 12 Letk ∈ N be the largest integer such that 2k −1 δ ≤ 1 ( Figure 3 illustrates the argument for the casek = 3).
In words, rst draw (i) the R 1 -and R 2 -indierence curves through ω; and (ii) a square of size δ whose bottom-right vertex lies at ω.
13 The R 2 -indierence curve 12 To lighten notation, we refer to all points using the coordinates with respect to agent 1's origin. 13 Since we use the Edgeworth box representation, the R 2 -indierence curve through ω is, in fact, and ω 2 = (1, 0). Letk ∈ N be the largest integer such that 2k −1 δ ≤ 1 (the gure illustrates the argument for the casek = 3). Let R ∈ R N lin be such that 1 < s(R 1 ) < s(R 2 ). We show by induction that for each k ∈ {1, · · · ,k},
, and e k (·) are suppressed). In particular, the latter statement is true for k =k. Because 2kδ > 1, the R 1 -indierence curve through ak(R 2 ) and the R 2 -indierence curve through bk(R 1 ) intersect at a point outside the Edgeworth box. Thus, ϕ(R, ω) violates feasibility, a contradiction. Now the R 1 -indierence curve through a 2 (R 2 ) and the R 2 -indierence curve through
Repeating the above argument, we construct the remaining points.
Now we proceed in two steps.
Step 1: For each R ∈ R N lin such that 1 < s(R 1 ) < s(R 2 ), and each k ∈ K,
The proof is by induction. First, let k = 1.
To show that x 1 R 1 a 1 (R 2 ), suppose, by contradiction, that the R 1 -indierence curve through x 1 passes through some point f ≡ (
be such that δ 1−f 1 < s(R 1 ) < s(R 2 ); i.e., typical indierence curves of R 1 are steeper than the line segment joining (1, 0) and f , but atter than those of R 2 . Note that
Among the points in the latter set, b 1 (R 1 ) uniquely minimizes R 1 , and yet b 1 (R 1 ) P 1 x 1 .
Thus, if agent 1 with true preference relation R 1 faces agent 2 announcing R 2 , he is better o announcing R 1 than telling the truth, in violation of strategy-proofness. A symmetric argument shows that x 2 R 2 (Ω − b 1 (R 1 )).
Now suppose that the claim holds for some k ≥ 1 and that k + 1 ∈ K. Let R ∈ R N lin be such that 1 < s(R 1 ) < s(R 2 ). Let x ≡ ϕ(R, ω). Let R 1 ∈ R lin be such that s(R 1 ) < s(R 1 ) < s(R 2 ), and we apply the induction hypothesis to (R 1 , R 2 , ω).
the R 2 -indierence curve through ω 2 . Throughout the paper, all statements concerning agent 2's indierence curves should be understood this way. Only when comparing bundles according to agent 2's preference relation, we use the coordinate system with respect to agent 2's origin; e.g., we write 
. Among the points in the latter set, c k (R 1 , R 2 ) uniquely minimizes R 1 . If c k (R 1 , R 2 ) P 1 x 1 , then when agent 1 with true preference relation R 1 faces agent 2 announcing R 2 , he is better o announcing R 1 than telling the truth, in violation of strategy-proofness. Thus,
Note that this is true for each R 1 ∈ R lin such that s(R 1 ) < s(R 1 ) < s(R 2 ). Now construct a sequence of preference relations {R ν 1 } ν∈N such that (i) for each ν ∈ N, s(R 1 ) < s(R ν 1 ) < s(R 2 ); and (ii) and lim ν→∞ s(R ν 1 ) = s(R 2 ). Then for each ν ∈ N,
, and the claim is established for k + 1.
Step 2: Concluding.
, and in particular, this is true for k =k.
Because 2kδ > 1, the R 1 -indierence curve through ak(R 2 ) and the R 2 -indierence curve through bk(R 1 ) intersect at a point outside the Edgeworth box. Thus, ϕ(R, ω)
violates feasibility, a contradiction.
Case 2: There are more than two commodities; i.e., M = {1, · · · , m}, where m ≥ 3.
( Figure 4 illustrates the argument for the case m = 3.) Let ω 1 = (1, 0, · · · , 0) and ω 2 = (0, 1, · · · , 1). It is easy to see that for each R ∈ R N lin such that r 1 = (r 11 , 1, · · · , 1), r 2 = (r 21 , 1, · · · , 1), and 1 < r 11 < r 21 , E(R, ω) = {x ∈ Z(ω) : either x 11 = 0 or E(R, ω) ). Thus, we can construct a hypercube of size δ in the m dimensional Edgeworth box such that (i) one of its vertices lies at ω; and (ii) it does not intersect with the interior of E δ (R, ω) (if m = 3, then E δ (R, ω) is the closure of the neighborhood of E(R, ω) with radius 1 − δ).
14 Since the counterpart of the latter hypercube in Case 1 is the square of size δ whose bottom-right vertex lies at ω, we can now proceed as in Case 1.
14 For simplicity, here we identify a feasible allocation with agent 1's bundle. If we treat the hypercube as an object in Z(ω), which is a 2m dimensional space, then its size is √ 2δ. (1 − δ, 1) . If x = b, then by δ-strategy-proofness, for each R 1 ∈ R, ϕ 1 (R 1 , R 2 , ω) lies on or below the R 1 -indierence curve through c (note that the ratio of the distance from O 2 to the R 1 -indierence curve through c to the distance from O 2 to the R 1 -indierence curve through b is δ). Similarly, if x ∈ seg[a, b), then for each R 1 ∈ R, ϕ 1 (R 1 , R 2 , ω) lies below the R 1 -indierence curve through c. Now let R 1 ∈ R lin be such that
Then by individual rationality and eciency, ϕ 1 (R 1 , R 2 , ω) ∈ seg[d, e], in violation of δ-strategy-proofness. Case 2: There are more than two commodities; i.e., M = {1, · · · , m}, where m ≥ 3.
( Figure 6 illustrates the argument for the case m = 3.) Let ω 1 = (1, 0, · · · , 0) and ω 2 = (0, 1, · · · , 1). It is easy to see that for each R ∈ R N lin such that r 1 = (r 11 , 1, · · · , 1), r 2 = (r 21 , 1, · · · , 1), and 0 < r 11 < r 21 , E(R, ω) = {x ∈ Z(ω) : either x 11 = 0 or respectively. Consider the (δ I , δ E , δ S )-space in Figure 7 .
it can be represented as a point in the three-dimensional unit cube. Hurwicz (1972) shows that (under some assumptions on the preference domain) no rule is individually rational, ecient, and strategy-proof, which corresponds to the non-existence of a rule at point a ≡ (1, 1, 1) . By contrast, our approach is to x δ I at 1 and vary δ E or δ S , one at a time. First, we set δ I = δ S = 1 and decrease δ E , i.e., depart from point a along seg[a, c], until an existence result emerges. Theorem 1 says that this way of weakening is no more promising: at each point in seg[a, c), no rule satises the three axioms. Next, if we set δ I = δ E = 1 and decrease δ S , i.e., depart from point a along seg[a, d], then Theorem 2
15 For instance, we may dene {δ-individual rationality} δ∈[0,1] as follows. First, for each R 0 ∈ R and
The identity of agent i may vary depending on the endowment prole chosen. However, once we
and treat a preference prole as an economy, the rule ϕ(·, ω) : i.e., at point a in the gure, no rule is δ I -individually rational, δ E -ecient, and δ S -strategy-proof .
Earlier studies show that at each point in seg[a, b), the three axioms are incompatible. Theorems 1 and 2 show that the same is true on seg[a, c) and seg[a, d), respectively. answers our question: at each point in seg[a, d), no rule satises the three axioms. In sum, the region indicated by thick solid line segments in Figure 7 represents the set of (δ I , δ E , δ S ) at which we have an impossibility.
Robustness of the Results
Since Theorems 1 and 2 rely on the denition of δ-eciency and δ-strategy-proofness, one may ask how our results would be aected if the two axioms are dened dierently.
Now we pursue this question of robustness in two directions.
Using dierent distance notions
In dening δ-eciency and δ-strategy-proofness, we use the standard Euclidean distance for convenience, but Theorems 1 and 2 can be proved with dierent distance notions. We explain how the results can be extended in this regard. of Theorem 2, the Euclidean distance is used to deduce an implication of δ-strategyproofness: for each R 1 ∈ R, ϕ 1 (R 1 , R 2 , ω) lies on or below the R 1 -indierence surface through (1 − δ, 1, · · · , 1) (and a symmetric implication for agent 2). As long as there is (R,ω) ∈ E(R) such thatd(·, ·) yields similar implications, the rest of the argument still holds. In particular, this is the case ifd(·, ·) is a weighted Euclidean distance; i.e.,
Using dierent parametrization methods
As another way of checking the robustness of Theorems 1 and 2, we work with a general parametrization method. We rst consider a requirement that a reasonable parametrization should meet, and then show that as long as a parametrization satises it, the results similar to Theorems 1 and 2 obtain.
Eciency and strategy-proofness concern agents' welfare. Therefore, it is best to formulate a parametrization so that a change in welfare is captured precisely. However, the data in our model is not so amenable to such analysis. Each agent only has an ordinal preference relation. Unless we take its numerical representation, it is impossible to measure the change in welfare in exact terms. This challenge led us to use the Euclidean distance in our parametrizations. The Euclidean distance is certainly a coarse measure of welfare (the distance between two consumption bundles does not perfectly reect the dierence in welfare that an agent derives from them). Yet, as we argue now, when δ approaches zero, the imprecision of δ-eciency and δ-strategy-proofness in capturing welfare changes vanishes.
Recall that Theorem 1 establishes the non-existence of a rule for any δ ∈ (0, 1]. If δ is suciently close to zero, the set of δ-ecient allocations is almost the same as the set of feasible allocations. Since preference relations are continuous, this means that we can attain almost all proles of feasible welfare levels with δ-ecient allocations. In sum, as δ approaches zero, the idiosyncrasy of the Euclidean distance disappears and δ-eciency behaves just as well as any appealing parametrization of eciency does.
To demonstrate this point formally, we rst introduce some concepts. Assume, henceforth, that N = {1, 2} and R lin ⊆ R. For each (R, ω) ∈ E(R) and each x ∈ Z(ω), x is most inecient for (R, ω) if (i) x is not ecient; and (ii) there is no y ∈ Z(ω) such that x Pareto dominates y for (R, ω). Now we dene a property that a reasonable parametrization should satisfy. Let {γ-eciency} γ∈[0,1] be a parametrization of eciency. Let (R, ω) ∈Ê(R). Because ω is most inecient for (R, ω)hence, least desirable in terms of eciencywe may require that ω be announced γ-ecient for (R, ω) only if γ-eciency has no bite. Now x γ ∈ (0, 1]. Since ω is not γ-ecient for (R, ω) and since the preference relations are continuous, there is a suciently small neighborhood of ω consisting of allocations that are almost as inecient as ω. We should also announce these allocations not γ-ecient.
Moreover, since for each economy inÊ (R), the set of ecient allocations is the same, 17 We embed condition (i) in the denition of most inecient allocations to exclude ecient allocations that satisfy (ii). An allocation can be ecient and satisfy (ii) because we restrict attention to proles of bundles whose sums equal the sum of endowments. the neighborhood of ω should be independent of the choice of (R, ω). This argument motivates the following property: for each γ ∈ (0, 1] and each γ-ecient rule ϕ, there is ε > 0 such that for each (R, ω) ∈Ê(R), ||ϕ(R, ω) − ω|| ≥ ε. We call this property condition C 1 . The next result shows that condition C 1 is enough for the impossibility in Theorem 1. 18 However, the proof of Theorem 1 shows that for each δ > 0, no rule is individually rational, δ-ecient, and strategy-proof onÊ (R), a contradiction.
Next, we turn to the robustness of Theorem 2. The theorem establishes the nonexistence of a rule for any δ ∈ (0, 1]. If δ is suciently close to zero, then δ-strategyproofness allows an agent to attain almost all feasible bundles by manipulating a rule.
Since his true preference relation is continuous, this means that he can achieve a welfare level that is arbitrarily close to the maximum welfare level possible for him. Thus, as δ approaches zero, the role of the Euclidean distance in the construction becomes immaterial and {δ-strategy-proofness} δ∈[0,1] behaves in a way that any reasonable parametrization of strategy-proofness should.
18 Let E(R) * ⊆ E(R) and let ϕ be a rule dened on E(R). Let δ ∈ [0, 1]. Then ϕ is individually rational on E(R) * if for each (R, ω) ∈ E(R) * , ϕ(R, ω) is individually rational for (R, ω); ϕ is δ-ecient on E(R) * if for each (R, ω) ∈ E(R) * , ϕ(R, ω) is δ-ecient for (R, ω); and ϕ is strategyproof on E(R) * if for each (R, ω) ∈ E(R) * , each i ∈ N , and each
Now we give a formal argument expressing this idea. Assume, henceforth, that N = {1, 2}. Let {γ-strategy-proofness} γ∈[0,1] be a parametrization of strategy-proofness. Let ω 1 = (1, 0), ω 2 = (0, 1), and Ω ≡ ω 1 +ω 2 . Fix γ ∈ (0, 1] and suppose that ϕ is γ-strategyproof. Consider an arbitrary agent, say i ∈ N . Let R ∈ R N lin be such that ϕ i (R, ω) = Ω. When agent i with true preference relation R i faces agent j ∈ N \{i} announcing R j , he does not get all of the endowments, Ω, by telling the truth. Since γ-strategy-proofness requires ϕ to have at least a minimal form of immunity to manipulation, agent i should not be allowed to attain, by lying, a welfare level that is arbitrarily close to the level that Ω provides, or in physical terms, a bundle that is arbitrarily close to Ω. This suggests imposing the following property on parametrizations of strategy-proofness: for each γ ∈ (0, 1], each γ-strategy-proof rule ϕ, and each i ∈ N , there is ε > 0 such that
We call this property condition C 2 . The next result shows that condition C 2 is enough for the impossibility in Theorem 2. By γ-strategy-proofness, for each R 1 ∈ R, ||ϕ 1 (R 1 , R 2 , ω) − Ω|| ≥ ε||x 1 − Ω|| ≥ ε (if x = b, then ||x 1 − Ω|| = 1; otherwise, ||x 1 − Ω|| > 1). Now let R 1 ∈ R lin be such that Case 2: There are more than two commodities; i.e., M = {1, · · · , m}, where m ≥ 3.
The argument in Case 1 can be adapted to allow for more than two commoditiesas in the proof of Theorem 2. We omit the obvious proof.
Concluding Remarks
We conclude by discussing two issues.
Assumptions on the preference domain.
Each of our results assumes that the preference domain contains linear preference relations. In proofs, we use linear preference relations primarily because they allow us to explicitly calculate the coordinates of the points we are interested in. It is clear that one can derive similar impossibility results, essentially with the same proof, imposing weaker assumptions on the preference domain. For instance, to prove an analog of Theorem 1, it is enough to assume that the preference domain contains the following:
(i) a pair of preference relations, say R 1 and R 2 , such that the R 1 -indierence surface through ω is everywhere atter than the R 2 -indierence surface through ω; and (ii) a collection of preference relations, whose indierence surfaces through ω lie between the R 1 -and R 2 -indierence surfaces through ω and are arbitrarily close to them.
Identifying the possibility-impossibility boundary in the (δ I , δ E , δ S )-space. In particular, we do not know whether a rule exists on the faces or in the interior of the unit cube. Thus, one may attempt to identify the possibility-impossibility boundary in the (δ I , δ E , δ S )-space.
While the question is intriguing in itself, it would necessitate a completely new proof technique. Impossibility results are typically proved by a pathological counterexample, for which one of the axioms imposed is violated. Therefore, even though no rule exists at a particular point (δ I , δ E , δ S ) in the unit cube, there is no guarantee that the same proof technique would work in a neighborhood of (δ I , δ E , δ S ). Moreover, when it does not work, we cannot be assured that we are near the possibility-impossibility boundary; we still need to check if all examples fail to deliver an impossibility. Since there are a continuum of economies in the domain and a continuum of ways in which agents can misrepresent, this task will prove demanding.
Further, even if a satisfactory answer is available, it would be dicult to extract a meaningful economic content from the answer. The possibility-impossibility boundary characterizes the tradeo between the three axioms. Since it also serves as a necessary condition for impossibility results, it is very sensitive to the parametrization method chosen. A slight perturbation of the parametrization method may greatly aect the boundary. Therefore, we cannot deduce a robust interpretation from, e.g., the statement 26 that a rule exists at (δ I , δ E , δ S ) if and only if δ I + δ E + δ S ≤ 1.
